The Missing Link?

The counterterrorism operations in Somalia have been a protracted and complex struggle, marked by significant military gains followed by frustrating reversals. This article identifies the critical missing element in the war against Al-Shabaab (AS): the lack of a comprehensive stabilization plan to secure military gains, establish governance, and deliver essential services. Without addressing this gap, the cycle of liberation and reoccupation will persist, undermining efforts to achieve lasting peace and security in Somalia.

Territorial Gains and Losses Cycle

Since 2011, when AS withdrew from Mogadishu after being defeated, the Somali government's presence has been largely confined to major regional and urban centers. While the Somali National Army (SNA), supported by African Union forces and international partners, has made notable progress in reclaiming territory and expanding its reach, the inability to secure and stabilize these areas has allowed AS to regroup and return.

In August 2022, the SNA, alongside clan militias, launched a significant offensive against Al-Shabaab, dubbed "Operation Black Lion." This campaign marked a shift from previous foreign-led efforts, with the SNA taking a more prominent role alongside local militias known as Ma’awisley. The offensive capitalized on growing discontent among Somali clans, particularly in the central states of Hirshabelle and Galmudug, where Al-Shabaab’s heavy taxation and repression had eroded its legitimacy. By mid-2023, the SNA and its allies had liberated over 200 settlements, reclaiming swathes of territory in regions like Hiraan, Galgaduud, and Middle Shabelle for the first time in over a decade. However, as the offensive progressed into late 2023 and 2024, momentum stalled. AS regrouped and began recapturing liberated territories as military and clan forces withdrew, leaving excited but vulnerable civilians exposed and highlighting critical weaknesses in the strategy.

Al-Shabaab Playbook- Evade, Harass, Strike

Insurgent groups like AS are not built to engage in open combat with a conventional military. Their strength lies in asymmetry—avoiding direct engagements where they would be outmatched and instead waging a war of attrition. This strategy has kept them resilient despite years of offensives. Here’s how it plays out:

AS withdrew as SNA and its allies’ advances, rarely standing its ground. This is not defeat—it’s a tactical retreat. They blend into rural landscapes or civilian populations, preserving their fighters and resources for a later comeback. Direct battles are anathema to their design; they know a toe-to-toe fight favors the state’s superior firepower.

Once government forces move on or become overextended, AS reemerges with hit-and-run tactics. Small-scale ambushes, roadside bombs, and suicide attacks target isolated outposts or supply lines, wearing down morale and resources. When opportunities arise, the group escalates to bold, coordinated surprise strikes on military bases or towns left vulnerable after military chases them—get them off their back, project power to hide defeats and demoralize, by overrunning bases, killing dozens (including senior military officials), and seizing weapons, these strikes are not random; they are calculated moves to force SNA withdrawals without risking full engagement.

This cycle raises questions about the sustainability of military operations and underscores the urgent need for a more comprehensive approach beyond standalone military campaigns. The pattern reveals a fundamental mismatch: the government fights as if facing a conventional army, while AS follows a classic insurgency playbook—evade, harass, strike.

What’s Missing Link?

The war against AS falters because it misunderstands the opposing force. The SNA, while effective in combat operations, is not designed to serve as a long-term stabilizing force. It lacks the capacity to navigate local politics, establish governance structures, or provide essential services such as security, justice, and basic infrastructure. The missing element is a proactive stabilization framework—securing territory must be part of the offensive plan, not an afterthought. Here’s why this gap undermines counter terrorism efforts:

Treating military offensives as ends, not means, is a fundamental misstep. AS doesn’t fight head-on—they evade, harass, and strike when weak spots emerge. Without securing gains as part of the plan, every push against them sets the stage for their comeback. Stabilization is not a sequel to victory; it is the victory itself. Until the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and its partners grasp this, the insurgency will continue to outmaneuver them, turning hard-fought battles into fleeting gains.

The rush to capture more territory without consolidating control stretches resources thin, inviting AS’s return. Every offensive must anticipate this—planning not just to take but to fortify—because AS doesn’t need to win battle, only outlast their foe.

Current operations treat stabilization as a separate element, if at all. This reactive approach cedes the initiative to AS, letting them dictate the tempo. Securing gains should be the offensive’s backbone—every move forward paired with a plan to stay—otherwise, it’s a hollow exercise.

AS return is not just military; it’s political. It signals to local populations that the government cannot protect them or maintain a lasting presence. Without governance teams moving in alongside the military to establish law, resolve disputes, and deliver services, civilians see no alternative to AS rule. Stabilization means having boots on the ground and administrators at the ready, not weeks later.

What Should Be Done?

To break the cycle, the FGS must rethink its approach. Offensives should be designed with phased consolidation, not endless expansion. Securing a region fully—fortifying bases and building local trust—before moving to the next denies AS space to regroup.