Over the past 30 days, from mid-February to March 19, 2025, Al-Shabaab (AS) has intensified its operations across Somalia’s Middle and Lower Shabelle regions and Banadir, with a notable escalation near Mogadishu. The March 18 improvised explosive device (IED) attack targeting the presidential convoy in central Mogadishu underscores AS’s emboldened campaign. This commentary examines the drivers of AS’s resurgence, its evolving tactics, and the implications.
Why Now?. AS recent offensive is a calculated response to shifting political and military dynamics.
First, with local elections slated for June in Mogadishu and September 2025 for state-level elections, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), no longer busy with Ethiopia diplomatic tensions, has redirected its focus to expanding its influence in more electoral zones, particularly in Hirshabelle and Southwest. AS is responding to this shift by destabilizing these areas, aiming to disrupt the electoral process and undermine FGS legitimacy.
Second, the fragmentation of clan militias—once the backbone of Operation Black Lion in Middle Shabelle—has provided AS with a strategic opening. Over the past year, divisions among clans have weakened their collective resistance, especially Hawadle and Abgal clan conflicts in Middle Shabelle, allowing AS to confront smaller, less coordinated groups. In late January 2025, an independent clan offensive against AS in Hiraan prompted the FGS to dispatch the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) Director, signaling intent to unify these clans and wage a unified offensive. AS’s intensified attacks appear designed to preempt any revival of a cohesive clan-led front.
Third, the lifting of Somalia’s arms embargo and the FGS’s acquisition of advanced Bayraktar Akıncı drones from Türkiye have reshaped the battlefield. Enhanced air capabilities have disrupted AS’s rural strongholds, pushing the group toward urban centers in Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, and Mogadishu’s outskirts, where drone strikes are limited to avoid civilian casualties. AS has capitalized on this by taking small villages and towns in these regions and along the Mogadishu-Afgoye corridor, patrolling streets, establishing checkpoints, and filming propaganda videos to project power and create panic in Mogadishu.
Tactical Evolution. current offensive reveals a profound evolution in its tactics, departing from its traditional hit-and-run approach. Historically, the group would strike isolated military posts or besiege towns before withdrawing, leveraging these attacks for propaganda. Now, AS is defending its territorial gains and persistently attempting to recapture lost ground. Security analysts describe this shift toward territorial consolidation as suggesting a strategic intent to establish governance-like control rather than merely projecting power. But the question is: can they maintain defense given logistical and manpower challenges and recent setbacks the group faced in Operation Black Lion, where they lost fighters and territories?
Another striking change is the softer stance toward local populations and captured fighters. The group is now offering amnesty to clan militia members, treating them as prisoners of war and releasing filmed statements to showcase leniency. This tactic aims to fracture the FGS-clan alliance by encouraging surrenders with promises of safety and freedom. While it may not sway entire clans, it sows doubt among individual fighters, who might question the worth of risking their lives when AS offers an alternative. Notably, AS has also refrained from banning the Somali flag in newly captured areas—a departure from its past practice of immediately hoisting its black flag—signaling an intent to rebrand itself as less draconian and more palatable to local communities.
Evolving strategy presents a complex set of risks and opportunities. The group’s transition to territorial control and urban operations may stretch its resources thin and expose its fighters to new vulnerabilities. However, it also signals AS’s intent to compete for legitimacy, not just military dominance. The FGS must capitalize on its superior air assets and integrate these with coordinated ground operations to deny AS the initiative—particularly in transitional zones along the Shabelle River areas and Mogadishu outskirts.
Reinvigorating clan cohesion is critical. AS’s divide-and-conquer strategy—amplified by amnesty campaigns and psychological operations—can be effectively countered through sustained outreach, community engagement, material support, and the reconstitution of joint defense arrangements. Integrating militias into the formal army structure under Darwish or SNA is necessary for long-term stability. Failure to do so risks further erosion of local resistance and the normalization of AS presence.
AS’s soft-power tactics, including its symbolic use of national flags and promises of safe conduct, are intended to reshape its image and blur the lines between insurgency and governance. Rebutting this narrative will require the FGS to deliver visible, people-centered governance—particularly in newly liberated areas.
AS’s current campaign reveals a sophisticated recalibration of its insurgency in both form and function. Its bid to reshape its image, expand territorial control, and re-engage with civilian populations reflects a group adapting to battlefield setbacks with political acuity. As Somalia approaches critical elections, the stakes are high—not only for the FGS’s legitimacy but for the long-term viability of its counterinsurgency strategy.
The coming months will test whether Somalia’s security apparatus and political leadership can meet this challenge with equal agility, unity, and strategic clarity.