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Fix The Federal System.


Federalism in Somalia remains undefined, contested, and routinely weaponized for political leverage. This is not an incidental byproduct of state fragility or capacity gaps; it is the structural consequence of a federal architecture established without a completed constitution or a final political settlement.

Priority One:  Agenda 2028 
The IssueSolutionPhase onePhase TwoPhase Three

The Issue

 The 2012 Provisional Constitution laid down foundational principles of federalism, power-sharing, and civilian oversight, but it did so without providing definitive rules, default authorities, or enforceable dispute-resolution mechanisms. Core state functions including security, justice, elections, and natural resource management were deliberately left to be “negotiated and agreed upon” through future laws. Thirteen years later, those negotiations remain incomplete, and the priority laws have never been enacted, institutionalizing ambiguity at the heart of the state 

The result is a rules-less federal system where overlapping mandates and unclear lines of command generate recurring political crises. In the absence of binding legal frameworks and neutral arbitral institutions, these foundational ambiguities have hardened into permanent points of conflict

Solution

Three-phase constitutional recovery strategy each phase is anchored explicitly in mandates deferred, gaps identified, and obligations imposed by the Provisional Constitution. This is not a long-term constitutional overhaul, but a pragmatic reset aimed at operationalize existing constitutional provisions, resolve long-standing mandate ambiguities and realigning key actors around enforceable rules and restoring the authority of institutions over personalities.

The objective is to restore predictability and clarity to federal–state relations by establishing permanent, legally empowered institutions capable of managing coordination and resolving disputes without political coercion. 

Phase one

Consensus For a Functioning Federation

The political consensus required to unlock Somalia’s federal system must be achieved through high-level leadership dialogue, as the Provisional Constitution explicitly requires that unresolved elements of the federal structure be negotiated, agreed upon, and institutionalized by the Federal Government (FG) and the Federal Member States (FMS).

This dialogue should focus primarily on current officeholders—federal and state presidents—who exercise direct control over institutions and security forces. A broader and more inclusive political process can follow once stability and institutional clarity are restored. Key opposition figures and former national leaders should be consulted either at the outset or prior to finalization to broaden political legitimacy and buy-in.

Constitutional completion and amendment cannot proceed through unilateral action. The dialogue must therefore be structured, time-bound, and oriented toward producing enforceable outcomes rather than political statements.

The dialogue shall produce specific, negotiated agreements that enable Parliament to enact the Priority Laws listed in Schedule One (D) of the Provisional Constitution. At a minimum, it must deliver agreement on the following:

  • Clear Division of Mandates and Resources. Fulfilling Article 54 by negotiating and agreeing upon the allocation of powers beyond the four exclusive federal domains.
  • Renewed Security Pact and National Security Architecture. Political consensus required for Parliament to enact the Security Agencies Laws mandated under Article 130 and the Security Pact and National Security Architecture (2017 and 2023).
  • Establishment of Coordination Mechanisms: Agreement on the frameworks necessary for Parliament to legislate binding intergovernmental dispute-resolution, arbitration, and coordination mechanisms, in line with Articles 95 and 111F.
  • Interim Dispute Resolution Role of the Upper House. Until the Court is fully operational, the Federal Senate will be legally empowered as a temporary arbiter for federal-state disputes.
  • Clear Action Plan for Institutional Reform. A sequenced and time-bound roadmap for establishing constitutionally mandated institutions that remain unimplemented.
  • Federal Electoral Model and Timeline. Agreement on a federal electoral system and electoral calendar, including the May 2026 timeline and the remaining three state presidential elections, to enable Parliament to enact the required special laws governing elections and political parties, whether under Law No. 19 (2016) or Law No. 20 (2024).

Without resolving these core constitutional ambiguities, progress in other reform areas will remain fragile and reversible.

The dialogue shall not substitute for legislation. Its sole purpose is to generate the political agreements necessary for Parliament to legislate binding rules, restore constitutional order, and complete the federal system envisioned in the Provisional Constitution. 

Phase Two

Enacting Binding Federal Statutes

Following political agreement, Parliament must translate negotiated outcomes into binding statutory law and enforceable rules. To operationalize the federal system and the security sector governance, the Provisional Constitution explicitly requires the enactment of priority legislation listed under Schedule One (D).Two primary statutes are required.  

Parliament shall enact a binding Federal Mandate Act to operationalize Article 54 by establishing a clear, comprehensive, and enforceable division of powers between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. 

 Federal Allocation of Powers

The Act shall formally establish the following categories of authority:

  • Exclusive Federal Powers, limited to foreign policy, national defense, immigration and citizenship, and monetary policy.
  • Shared Powers, including justice and courts, natural resource management, revenue sharing, national security cooperation, and elections, governed by clearly defined coordination mechanisms, supremacy rules, and dispute-resolution procedures.
  • Exclusive State Powers, encompassing local administration, basic service delivery, municipal governance, and state-level policing, exercised within nationally agreed security, constitutional, and legal frameworks.

Statutory Framework For Federal Cooperation

  • Operationalize Federal Principles. The Act shall codify and enforce the principles of federalism set out in Article 50, ensuring Federal-state relation is based on mutual cooperation, support, and strict respect for constitutional boundaries.
  • Collaborative Governance. In accordance with Article 51, the Act shall prescribe binding rules for intergovernmental coordination and joint decision-making in areas where federal and state mandates intersect.
  • Legal Safeguards and Due Process. The Act shall establish clear safeguards to ensure that any limitation of fundamental rights occurs only by law, for a legitimate constitutional purpose, and in a manner that is demonstrably reasonable and justified, as required by Article 38.

 Statutory Protection of Constitutional Authority

The Federal Mandate Act shall codify binding legal obligations to protect constitutional institutions, prevent political interference, and ensure compliance with the federal allocation of powers.

  • Non-Interference Obligation. The Act shall impose a clear statutory duty on the FGS to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of FMS, and vice versa. Any action taken in violation of this duty shall be subject to parliamentary oversight and review by the Constitutional Court.
  • Regulation of External Engagement. Consistent with the FGS’s exclusive authority over foreign affairs (Article 54), all foreign political, security, and financial engagement must occur through mandated federal channels. Unauthorized external engagement by sub-national entities shall constitute a violation of federal law.
  • Protection of Oversight and Independence. In accordance with the principles of separation of powers and democratic accountability under Article 3, the Act shall reaffirm and protect the independence of the Judiciary and the authority of constitutional bodies to monitor, oversee, and hold national institutions accountable. The Act shall explicitly prohibit any executive action that undermines the lawful authority of constitutional bodies.

 Parliament shall enact a binding Federal Security Act, agreed between the Federal Government (FG) and the Federal Member States (FMS), to establish a clear division of labor, command authority, oversight arrangements, and cost-sharing mechanisms across the security sector. The Act shall give legal force to the National Security Architecture and replace ad hoc arrangements with enforceable rules governing federal–state security relations.

This Act is enacted pursuant to the Provisional Constitution, including Articles 54, 90, 111H, 126, 128, 129, and 130, and Schedule One (D). It shall constitute the overarching Security Agencies Law required by the Constitution and shall govern the structure, functions, command authority, coordination mechanisms, civilian oversight, and accountability of all national security institutions of the Federal Republic of Somalia.

 Mandates, Command & Control

The Act shall legally codify the respective roles, authorities, and responsibilities of the FGS and FMS across defense, policing, intelligence, and justice. Specifically, the Act shall:

  • Reaffirm the Federal exclusive authority over National Defense and command of the Somali National Army (SNA), National Intelligence, and the Federal Police Service, as mandated under Article 54
  • States shall exercise full command and control over state police forces. These forces shall operate under the direction of state ministries responsible for internal security and justice.

The Act shall operationalize a dual-level policing system consistent with the federal structure and New Policing Model.

  • Federal police shall manage national and cross-state mandates.
  • State police forces are mandated to protect life, property, and peace within their territories, independently or in cooperation with federal police, as provided under Article 126(5).
  • State police forces, including Darwish units, are tasked with supporting SNA operations and serving as holding forces following territorial recovery, acting within state boundaries in coordination with national frameworks.

SNA Unification and Re-Sectorization

The Act shall reaffirm the SNA as a national, unified, representative, and inclusive force under federal command. To operationalize this, the Act shall:

  • Mandate Re-Sectorization. Reorganize the SNA in alignment with the federal map to enable structured, vertical coordination with FMS police institutions.
  • Empower the National Integration Commission. Legally activate the Commission to oversee force representation, integration, and compliance with national standards.
  • Create Statutory Integration Pathways. Establish clear, transparent criteria for the integration of regional forces into either the SNA or state police institutions. 

 Oversight & Finance

 The Act shall Establish Financial and Oversight Clarity

  • The Act shall specify which level of government bears the cost for the sustainment of particular forces.
  • The Act shall specify how parliamentary accountability is exercised at both the federal and state levels.
  • In accordance with Article 126(6), the Act shall codify the principle that all armed national security agencies are subject to civilian control.
  • The Act shall clarify constitutional requirements governing obedience to orders and provide statutory guidance on the legal consequences of complying with unlawful orders (Article 130).
  • Allegations of human rights violations committed by security forces against civilians shall fall under the jurisdiction of civilian courts (Article 128).
  • The Act shall protect the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate public complaints regarding security force abuses (Article 129).
  • Pursuant to Article 126(2), the Act shall establish legal thresholds and oversight for the domestic deployment of national forces within an FMS. Such deployment shall be permissible only when: The threat exceeds the capacity of state-level security institutions and the constitutional order or national security is at serious risk.
  • Civilian Oversight and Public Accountability. Pursuant to Article 111H(3) and (4), a Civilian Oversight Sub-Committee shall be established to allow the public to monitor security expenditure, access non-classified governance information, and submit complaints.

Coordination & Intergovernmental Cooperation 

To give effect to the principles set out in Articles 50 and 52, and to operationalize the shared security responsibilities established under Article 126(5), the Act shall establish binding mechanisms for security coordination between Federal and Member States.

The National Security Commission (NSC). Pursuant to Article 111H, the Act formally establishes the NSC as a permanent constitutional body managed by security professionals and civilian representatives.  The NSC shall:

  • Coordinate federal and state security policies and operations.
  • Manage cooperation between the SNA, Federal Police, FMS Police and other branches of armed forces.
  • Review proposed domestic deployments (except in time-critical emergencies).
  • Submit recommendations for parliamentary scrutiny.

Regional Security Councils (RSCs). To enable bottom-up security planning and structured state participation, the Act shall establish and empower RSCs under Federal Member State leadership. These councils shall: Lead state-level security planning and coordination; and serve as institutional links between state authorities and the National Security Commission.

Although not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the establishment of Regional Security Councils is consistent with the National Security Architecture and supports alignment between local operations and national strategy while respecting the federal distribution of authority.

NSC Secretariat and Sub-Committees. A professional NSC Secretariat shall be established to ensure institutional memory and implementation follow-through. The Act shall provide for thematic sub-committees (Defense, Policing, Intelligence, Stabilization) to host technical platforms that interface with RSCs under FMS leadership.

Integrated Security Framework. The NSC shall develop an Integrated National Security Framework for parliamentary adoption. This framework will define coordination protocols, information-sharing, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for emergencies and counter-terrorism. No national strategy or joint deployment shall take effect unless it is consistent with this Parliament-approved framework. 


Phase Three

Establish Neutral Authority

To end the cycle of personalized political disputes, permanent and legally empowered mechanisms must be fully activated. This phase is designed to move the nation from "rule by leaders" to the rule of law and ensures that disagreements over power, resources, or mandates are resolved through institutions rather than political standoffs.

 Pursuant to Articles 109B and 109C, the Constitutional Court must be established as the final and authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and the sole legal arbiter for disputes between FGS) and FMS.

  • Reconstitute JSC). To ensure a transparent and legitimate appointment process, the JSC must be immediately re-established. Following its dissolution in October 2022, the reconstitution of this body is the primary legal prerequisite to initiating the formation of the Constitutional Court.
  • Resolve Jurisdictional Ambiguity (Article 109). Parliament shall codify precise procedural and jurisdictional rules. These rules will distinctly delineate the boundaries between the Constitutional Court and the Federal High Court.
  • Pursuant to Article 111F, Parliament shall establish the ISC as a permanent, independent statutory body. Unlike temporary political forums, the ISC provides a stable administrative bridge between levels of government.
  • The ISC is mandated to facilitate intergovernmental coordination, mediate administrative and jurisdictional disputes, and refer unresolved constitutional issues to the judicial authorities.
  • The ISC shall be granted full legal personality and binding procedures, replacing the ad hoc, politically driven coordination forums currently in use. Its primary focus is preventing technical disputes from escalating into national crises.
  • The NCC must be formally codified by law as a political coordination forum only, ensuring it supports rather than replaces the constitutional institutions.
  • The NCC’s role shall be restricted to high-level political dialogue and the consideration of national issues formally presented through institutional channels.
  • The Act shall explicitly prohibit the NCC from issuing decrees that override existing law or the jurisdiction of the Parliament and the Judiciary.