Power, Order, and Constraints in a Shifting Global System
The reported move by Israel to recognize Somaliland should not be seen as an isolated diplomatic maneuver. Rather, it is a product of a shifting global order—one characterized by weakening norms, fragmented leadership, and increasing reliance on transactional politics. In such an environment, recognition has become a tactical instrument, deployed opportunistically rather than anchored in durable legal or political consensus.
Yet while the global order is in flux, it has not collapsed. Structural constraints remain firmly in place. It is these constraints—global, regional, and domestic—that make the recognition of Somaliland not only controversial, but ultimately unlikely to succeed.
A Shifting Global Order, Not an Absent One
The international system has transitioned from a unipolar order dominated by the United States to a more competitive multipolar environment. Great powers now operate alongside increasingly assertive middle and regional powers, while multilateral institutions struggle to enforce norms with the same authority they once commanded.
This transition has opened space for unilateral initiatives, particularly in regions such as the Horn of Africa, where geopolitical competition intersects with weak state capacity. Israeli engagement with Somaliland reflects this reality. It is driven by security considerations in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, by the logic of access and positioning, and by a global environment more tolerant of norm-testing behavior.
However, multipolarity does not mean permissiveness. Even in a fragmented system, recognition outcomes depend on alignment across power centers—not merely on opportunity.
Great Powers Still Matter
Despite perceptions of decline, great powers continue to impose structural limits on what middle powers can achieve.
The United States, while increasingly selective in its global engagement, has consistently reiterated its support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This position was reaffirmed recently at the United Nations Security Council, underscoring continuity rather than ambiguity in U.S. policy. Washington’s interest lies in preventing border revisionism in fragile regions, not enabling it.
China’s role is even more decisive. Beijing has deep and expanding economic, maritime, and strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. Its foreign policy is anchored in a strict preference for state sovereignty and territorial integrity—principles rooted in both ideology and self-interest. Significantly, China’s foreign minister has recently toured the region, visiting Ethiopia and Tanzania, and held direct discussions with Somalia’s foreign minister to reaffirm China’s support for Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity.
This reassurance is not symbolic. It signals that China views Somalia as a recognized state actor whose stability aligns with Beijing’s long-term interests in trade routes, infrastructure, and regional predictability. In practical terms, this amounts to a structural veto on recognition efforts that bypass Mogadishu.
Russia, while disruptive in other theaters, lacks both the capacity and the incentive to underwrite a reconfiguration of borders in the Horn.
In short, no great power is prepared to sustain Somaliland’s recognition in a way that would make it durable or systemically legitimate.
Regional Dynamics and Competing Alignments
At the regional level, the Horn of Africa has become increasingly crowded with assertive middle powers. The decline of consensus diplomacy and the rise of “gunboat” and transactional politics—ports, bases, security deals—have emboldened regional actors to test influence.
Yet these efforts are not unified. They are organized around competing axes.
In the Horn of Africa, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt form a significant alignment centered on Red Sea security, opposition to fragmentation, and the preservation of recognized state authority. Türkiye’s extensive institutional, military, and developmental footprint in Somalia gives it a strong stake in Somali unity. Egypt views Red Sea stability as an existential interest, while Saudi Arabia’s economic ambitions depend on predictable maritime and political order.
China’s presence reinforces this axis structurally, even when it operates quietly.
By contrast, transactional arrangements involving port access and security cooperation—often associated with the UAE–Israel axis—can deliver short-term gains but struggle when confronted by coordinated regional opposition and great-power constraints.
Somalia’s neighbors further complicate the picture. Ethiopia has clear strategic incentives to seek Red Sea access and has signaled openness to leveraging Somaliland to that end. However, Ethiopia’s maneuverability is constrained by Chinese interests, Turkish influence, and Egyptian opposition. Acting unilaterally would impose significant diplomatic and economic costs.
Kenya, for now, appears aligned with Mogadishu, prioritizing regional stability over experimentation. Djibouti, a critical Red Sea state and long-standing partner of Somalia, is firmly supportive of Mogadishu and is not aligned with the UAE–Israel axis. Its position further limits the regional space available for recognition efforts.
These dynamics generate pressure—but not momentum.
Why Recognition Is Unlikely to Hold
From an analytical standpoint, Israeli recognition of Somaliland is unlikely to endure for several reasons.
First, it lacks great-power endorsement. Second, it faces coordinated regional opposition. Third, it carries long-term costs by undermining state consolidation in a strategically sensitive region. Finally, it risks establishing precedents that extend beyond Somalia, unsettling borders across Africa and the Middle East.
Recognition may offer short-term access or leverage, but it does not resolve Somaliland’s challenges of legitimacy, international finance, or integration into global systems.
What Somalia Should Do
Somalia’s response must be realistic and disciplined.
First, it should deepen diplomatic coherence with the Türkiye–Saudi–Egypt axis, leveraging shared interests rather than reactive diplomacy.
Second, Somalia must continue professionalizing its influence in Washington. The engagement of lobbying and public affairs firms such as Arsenal Government and Public Affairs Group, legal expertise from BGR, and strategic advisory support to the president’s office, including from figures like Karl von Batten, provides Somalia with tools it has historically lacked. These assets should be deployed strategically, particularly as the Trump administration shapes Africa policy, appoints senior State Department officials, and revisits legislative frameworks with regional implications.
Third, Somalia must avoid projecting internal fragmentation. Federal and regional authorities must speak with clarity and coordination on sovereignty. Mixed signals weaken external leverage.
Finally, with the presidential term ending in May, a credible and agreed political process is essential. Domestic uncertainty directly undermines Somalia’s international position.
Israeli recognition of Somaliland reflects the realities of a shifting global order—but it miscalculates the structural constraints that still govern outcomes. In the Horn of Africa, power remains layered, alliances matter, and sovereignty has not lost its relevance.
Recognition without alignment is not strategy; it is experiment. And in this case, the experiment is unlikely to be held.
For Somalia, the challenge is not to resist change, but to organize power coherently within it.
Mohamed Halaneh, Political Analyst