Six-Point Agenda for a Functional Federation

The National Reconciliation Dialogue, announced by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was originally scheduled for February 1, 2026. While delayed due to political friction, it is now expected to take place later in February, though a new date is yet to be announced. This represents a rare, and perhaps final, opportunity to stabilize the federal system before the current government’s mandate expires on May 15.

However, dialogue alone is not a solution. For this summit to move beyond the superficiality of past "handshake" agreements, it must be outcome-driven. It must focus on resolving the core constitutional ambiguities that paralyze governance and fuel recurring cycles of crisis. The primary objective must be three-fold: the resolution of accumulated grievances, the restoration of functional working relationships, and the settlement of critical governance and security challenges.

The Provisional Constitution is explicit: unresolved elements of the federal structure must be negotiated, agreed upon, and institutionalized jointly by the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. After 13 years of postponement, the federalization of the state can no longer wait, nor can it be achieved through unilateral action. To prevent another cycle of deadlock and fragmentation, the dialogue should prioritize agreement on six essential outcomes:

First, the dialogue must produce a definitive agreement on the allocation of powers beyond the four exclusive federal domains, in line with Article 54. Currently, undefined authority undermines governance, service delivery, and public trust.

Second, leaders must renew the national security pact to provide the political consensus required for Parliament to finally enact the long-delayed Security Agencies Laws (Article 130) and to operationalize the National Security Architecture agreed in 2017 and 2023. Without this foundation, security reform will remain fragmented, localized, and reversible.

Third, the dialogue must deliver a signed agreement on establishing intergovernmental coordination and arbitration frameworks (Articles 95 and 111F). This is a prerequisite for a functional Constitutional Court; federal disputes can no longer be left to political brinkmanship or ad hoc mediation.

Fourth, until a fully operational Constitutional Court is established, the Upper House (Senate) must be legally empowered to serve as the temporary arbiter of federal-state disputes. This provides a vital "safety valve" to prevent institutional paralysis during the transition.

Fifth, the dialogue must produce a Consensus Roadmap for a functional federation and institutional reform agenda. This roadmap should clearly define how the next government will complete the constitution, establish unimplemented mandated institutions, and advance structural reforms. This will guide international partners to support a nationally endorsed reform agenda.

Sixth, and most importantly, it must deliver an agreement on the 2026 federal electoral model and timeline, as well as the timelines for the remaining three Federal Member State presidential elections.

Without agreement on these six pillars, progress in all other areas will remain fragile and easily reversed. Everything depends on this: countering Al-Shabaab, implementing security reforms, tackling the humanitarian crisis, and protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The purpose of this dialogue should not be to legislate laws, engineer a re-election plan, or replace the role of the legislature, but to generate the political consensus necessary for Parliament to restore constitutional order and finally complete the federal system envisioned in the Provisional Constitution (2012).

To avoid a legitimacy crisis, the process must be anchored in constitutional authority. The primary dialogue should be between current officeholder Federal and State Presidents who have the mandate, authority, and leverage required to translate agreements into enforceable results. 

However, broader inclusion is vital. Key opposition figures and former national leaders should be consulted at the outset, on the sidelines, and prior to any finalization to ensure wide-scale buy-in. While these actors are not currently elected officials nor a formal opposition under a legally constituted Political Parties Act, they cannot be ignored. They hold significant political capital and have the influence to destabilize the country if they do not agree with the outcome.

To prevent the reversal of agreements reached, federal and state parliamentary leadership must formally oversee the negotiations. Every outcome should be immediately ratified into law to ensure institutionalization. This is the only safeguard against the "personalized governance" that has historically undermined the state-building process. Furthermore, international partners, AU, EAC, IGAD, and UN should participate as observers and witnesses to provide the necessary diplomatic pressure and ensure accountability.