Somalia faces a convergence of political, security, and humanitarian crises that threaten its foundations, yet its leaders appear to be reading the wrong map. At a moment that demands political cohesion, security reform, and humanitarian action, the national debate has narrowed to elections, an exercise unlikely to resolve the crises pushing the country toward deeper fragility.
The National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission has scheduled a Mogadishu municipal election for 25 December 2025. On paper, this is presented as a step toward democratization. In principle, elections matter. In practice, however, Somalia must confront a more fundamental question: is this the right priority at this moment, and will an election solve the country’s deep political and security crises?
At this moment, Somalia’s challenges are not institutional cosmetics; they are existential. The country is facing a convergence of emergencies that elections alone cannot resolve.
The country is on the brink of a severe drought following a missed rainy season. An estimated 4.4 million people face acute food insecurity. At the same time, violence remains devastating: 9,568 lives were lost to conflict-related incidents between January and December 2025, according to ACLED. Meanwhile, large territories in Jubaland, Southwest, and Hirshabelle remains under Al-Shabaab control.
Yet none of these crises appears to command the urgency they deserve from either the government or the opposition. Instead, political energy is overwhelmingly consumed by election maneuvering.
This fixation is deeply misplaced. Any election held under current conditions is unlikely to be credible, transparent, or inclusive. With unresolved political disputes, weakened institutions, and a highly securitized environment, the risk of manipulation is high. Rather than renewing legitimacy, such elections may serve to entrench an already contested political order, fueling further polarization, instability, and violence.
The security context makes this risk even more acute. Al-Shabaab retains significant operational momentum, exploiting governance vacuums, political infighting, overstretched national forces, and the slow, underfunded transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM. Over the past year, the group has sustained a high operational tempo, expanding its influence across rural and semi-urban terrain and testing government control even near major population centers. AUSSOM itself faces a severe funding crisis. Only a small fraction of the required resources for 2025–2026 has been secured. Delayed deployments and extended troop-contributing country rotations have created real uncertainty for 2026. This undermines AUSSOM’s ability to support the Somali National Army and provide predictable security backing. Any abrupt drawdown or reduction in capability would create exploitable vacuums—precisely the conditions Al-Shabaab thrives in—while placing even greater strain on federal and member state forces.
Against this backdrop, prioritizing elections over stabilization is not just unrealistic; it is dangerous. If the Federal Government’s leadership is serious about solving the nation’s problems, its priority must shift immediately from campaigning to consensus-building. Instead of gearing up for an election, this means engaging federal member state leaders in good-faith negotiations to address their grievances, rebuild trust, and forge a shared agenda focused on territorial liberation, stabilization, genuine security reform, and presenting a united front to international partners to secure predictable funding for AUSSOM.
Elections can be part of Somalia’s future, but they cannot substitute for political settlement, security reform, and stabilization. Until those foundations are addressed, elections will not fix Somalia’s problems. The focus should instead be on what is at stake and on gradually building democracy. The goal should be to hold a different kind of election, one that meaningfully expands the scope and size of voter participation compared to past processes. Since 2012, every election in Somalia has differed in scope and the number of voters involved. The Federal Government should continue this incremental approach and pilot direct elections at the local council level to identify the most viable electoral model. This process must be inclusive, fair, and transparent, with all stakeholders on board. That is not what we are seeing today: as of 18 December 2025, just days before the Mogadishu municipal election, basic questions remain unanswered, including who the candidates are. Developing ambitious but unrealistic election plans that contradict stated goals will only perpetuate the familiar Somali paradox that has defined the past three decades.
Without improved political cohesion, predictable funding for AUSSOM, and coordinated civilian–security efforts, Somalia will enter 2026 with widening security gaps, higher humanitarian needs, and shrinking space for genuine democratic progress.
Ahmed Hassan is the Communications and Public Engagement Director at Amni Reform Initiative (ARI), he focuses on strategic communications, policy outreach, and public dialogue on security, governance, and reform.