Somalia is making uneven but notable progress in establishing a unified and legitimate security framework. Central to this effort is the National Security Architecture (NSA), a political and technical blueprint for building Somali-led security forces that are capable, accountable, affordable, and acceptable to all. Success will depend on stronger cooperation between federal and state actors, inclusive security arrangements, and institutions that can address both the root causes and realities of insecurity.
The NSA is strategic blueprint for managing its complex security landscape and fortifying its national security framework. It represents a collaborative effort between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS), with support from international partners. The NSA serves as a detailed manual outlining the structure, composition, command, control, financing, and responsibilities of military, police, and other security apparatus.
Evolution and Core Purpose
The NSA was initially introduced in May 2017 with the primary goal of establishing Somali-led security institutions that are affordable, acceptable, accountable, and capable (the "4As") of providing security and protection to the Somali people, in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights standards. This initial pact was built upon a political agreement between the FGS and FMS and aimed to address critical areas of reform, including the numbers and distribution of forces, command and control, and fiscal responsibilities.
However, the implementation of the 2017 NSA was overshadowed by internal discord between the former president Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and the FMS, leading to persistent political complexities. Subsequent leadership under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud sought to revitalize dialogue, leading to a revised NSA in 2023.
The 2023 revision reflects a significant evolution, marking a formalized agreement with the majority of FMSs, though notably excluding Puntland. Some aspects of this revised iteration have been incorporated into decisions by the National Consultative Council (NCC) and enacted into legislation, indicating a more durable nature.
Key Components and Responsibilities
The NSA outlines the roles and structures of various security entities, evolving from its initial design:
Somali National Army (SNA)
2017 Vision: The SNA was planned to number at least 18,000 (excluding Special Forces, Air Force, and Navy), with training to take place within Somalia under a unified doctrine. It was to fall under the Ministry of Defence. The SNA sectors were to be redrawn to align with FMS boundaries. A National Integration Commission was deemed crucial for ensuring the SNA represents each FMS and the entire country.
2023 Revisions: The revised NSA calls for an expansion of the SNA from 18,000 to 30,000 soldiers. This revision appears to centralize command in favor of the FGS. The appointment of SNA sector commanders is now solely in the hands of the Ministry of Defense and the federal Commander of the Armed Forces, reducing FMS leaders' influence.
Somali Police Force
2017 Vision: The police force was set to number 32,000, divided into Federal Police and State Police, including the Coastguard and Darwish. The Federal Police report to the relevant FGS Minister, while State-Level Police reports to FMS authorities.
2023 Revisions: The police force is planned to expand to 40,000 officers. The FGS's influence is augmented by assigning roles for FGS police within the FMS.
National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
2017 Omission: The original NSA notably omitted any defined role for NISA.
2023 Inclusion: The revised version explicitly defines NISA's responsibilities, stating that the federal government holds exclusive jurisdiction over intelligence activities, generally excluding FMS from intelligence gathering operations. This marks a significant shift towards centralization of intelligence functions.
Command and Control
National Security Council (NSC): The President of the FGS is the Commander in Chief of the SNA and the Chair of the NSC. The 2017 agreement expanded the NSC to include FMS presidents, the Prime Minister, FGS Ministers, and security chiefs, making it the pivotal body for policy and strategic matters.
Regional Security Councils (RSC): Chaired by FMS presidents, the RSCs are responsible for enforcing implementation of NSC policies. However, in the 2023 revision, the participation of SNA sector commanders in these regional councils was made optional.
Fiscal Responsibilities: The FGS is responsible for the salaries and support requirements of the SNA and the Federal Police, while FMSs are responsible for their respective State-Level Police forces. Internationally mobilized resources for the security sector are intended to be equitably distributed.
Key Challenges and Deficiencies
Despite its ambitious goals, the NSA faces significant challenges rooted in Somalia's complex political and clan dynamics: The NSA is met with varied reception among FMSs, influenced by their political alignment or misalignment with the FGS, historical clan rivalries, and economic dependencies.
Puntland Position: As the first and most stable state, Puntland has a history of advocating for a loose form of federalism and often views FGS actions as centralizing and infringing on its autonomy. Puntland withdrew from the NCC in March 2023 and is not part of the 2023 revised NSA agreement. It operates its own intelligence agency and has expressed concerns about the FGS's alleged unilateral constitutional amendments and the arming of clan militias.
Hirshabelle, Galmudug, Southwest, and Jubaland: These states generally hold more accommodating views due to the FGS-led anti-al-Shabaab campaign aligning with their objectives, the conciliatory stance of the current FGS president, and their financial reliance on the federal government. Jubaland's stance is further complicated by internal clan disputes and external geopolitical factors.
Constitutional Contradictions: A central deficiency is the practical utilization of entities not explicitly outlined in the provisional constitution, such as the NCC and NSC. The provisional constitution mandates a National Security Commission (Article 111H) which has never been created, and vests national security responsibilities with the Council of Ministers (Article 99), not the NSC. This provides fodder for opposition to accuse the FGS of disregarding constitutional requirements.
Informal Clan Militias (Macawisley): The emergence of Macawisley (informal local clan militias) as a central force in combating al-Shabaab poses a significant challenge. While effective in filling security gaps, their temporary integration into FGS armed forces is not aligned with the NSA and lacks a clear strategy, causing operational and political difficulties for the SNA. Their emergence as "uninformed state-sponsored clan militias is neither in the constitution nor the 2023 revised NSA".
Arming these militias is divisive among FMS, with Puntland, Jubaland, and Southwest expressing opposition due to fears of assets being redirected towards clan agendas and sparking inter-clan conflicts.
Clan Dynamics and Integration: The SNA faces challenges in establishing security across Somalia's diverse federal landscape due to clan dynamics. The perception that the SNA is "skewed in favor of certain clans" and potentially seen as an "occupying or partisan force" by some local populations, as seen in the Barawe incident in Southwest state, highlights the imperative for the SNA to reflect the diverse Somali population, respect local clan demographics, and be cognizant of historical grievances. This issue directly relates to the security dilemma where FMS are reluctant to give up their clan militias if the "national" army is perceived as clan-based.
The "Fighting vs. Building" Dilemma: The urgency of combating al-Shabaab often takes precedence over fundamental questions regarding the roles of security institutions, ensuring representation, and tackling corruption. This has led to a focus on military gains without sufficient attention to consolidating these gains through the restoration of law and order, governance, and basic services.
Promising Model
The Joint Forces of Galkacyo: This force, established in February 2018 and co-created/co-managed by Puntland, Galmudug, and the FGS, serves as a successful blueprint for an inclusive multi-clan force. It demonstrates that when communities and political entities have a stake in their security arrangements (e.g., equal troop contributions), stability can be maintained and local trust gained. This model operates effectively under central SNA command and has largely remained outside regional political frictions.
Recommendations
Building a more unified, efficient, and resilient security system requires a thoughtful, collaborative, and adaptable strategy:
Support merit-based involvement from all parts of society to ensure broad representation, while avoiding the reinforcement of clan-based divisions.
Improve cooperation between FGS and FMS levels in security planning and operations by prioritizing common objectives and mutual recognition of distinct roles and responsibilities.
FGS should uphold both the principles and constitution to maintain its legitimacy. Constructive and sincere dialogue with state members is crucial for a stable and mutually beneficial outcome that breaks away from political deadlock.
Develop Militia Integration Roadmap. clearly define procedures within the NSA for the short-term inclusion of community-based forces such as the Macawisley, ensuring consistency and clarity in the integration process.
Notes
1. Rift Valley Institute. (2024, March). The shaping of the Somali national security architecture [Policy brief]. Somali Dialogue Platform.
2. Keating, M., & Abshir, S. (2018, April). The politics of security in Somalia. New York University, Center on International Cooperation.
3. United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). (2017, May). Communique of the London Conference on Somalia.