In Somalia, the promise of democracy and unity has been eclipsed by an unrelenting power struggle, where self-interest consistently overshadows collective progress. Clan rivalries and federal dysfunction define a political landscape marked by a disturbing cycle of division and opportunism, often disguised as reform. This article aims to shed light on the complexities of Somalia’s political system and the personal interests driving its persistent challenges.
Somalia’s central government collapsed in 1991, With no functioning state, clans had become the backbone of governance, identity, and conflict. The nation splintered into villages, districts, regions, and zones controlled by militias loyal to clan leaders and warlords. Early 2000s international partners stepped into reconciliation efforts, the 2000 Arta Conference and the 2004 Mbagathi process. This process brought together clan elders, warlords, and civil society to reestablish a government aimed at balancing these powerful clan factions and finding win-win political solutions to bring some stability.
The result? A messy but practical compromise: the 4.5 formula. Somalia’s society is dominated by four major clans, these are the "4" in the formula, the "0.5" refers to a collection of minority clans—group of communities who are not necessarily related by blood like the big four come under this umbrella. Under this system, political positions—like parliamentary seats, cabinet roles, or other key posts—are divided equally among the four major clans, while the minority clans together get half the share of any one major clan.
It’s not exact equality; it’s a weighted compromise. The idea was to stop the endless clan wars by giving everyone a slice of the pie, ensuring no single group could dominate. It was baked into the transitional governments of the 2000s and carried over into the 2012 provisional constitution, even as Somalia shifted toward a federal system. In practice, it’s why you see clan elders and delegates—not ordinary voters—picking MPs, who then pick the president. It’s indirect, clannish, and a far cry from "one person, one vote. It’s a zero-sum game dressed up as cooperation. The major clans lock in their power, while the 0.5" minorities— who didn’t take part in the civil war were rewarded by being pushed out of the political system and marginalized in the political theater.
2012 new constitution was intended to promote equality and democratization. Instead, it reinforced and legitimized division by maintaining the 4.5 power-sharing formula. The federal state-building process followed the same formula, with the four major clans each securing their own state. This led to internal power struggles and gerrymandering at the state level, where clans compete to share political power. When a state president isn’t in local political turmoil, they are often in conflict with Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The federal system exists in theory but not in practice.
Direct election become excuse for extension. During election seasons, the government in power stretches its term, more is time needed to hold direct elections is an excuse to delay elections. This has become a pattern: the incumbent president eventually holds some form of election, but only after prolonged battles and political turmoil.
What is happening Now?
FGS president together with Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest, Hirshabelle and Banadir region agreed to move from an indirect, clan-based election model to a multiparty democratic, one-person-one-vote elections across the country, a plan that’s as ambitious as it is divisive. Following the agreement, parliament initiated constitutional amendments to reform the election system, From the start, major stakeholders—Puntland and all opposition leaders—rejected the process, calling it a new excuse by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to delay elections. They argued the country isn’t ready for a direct election model due to security issues and Somaliland’s absence from the federal government.
FGS pushed forward without Puntland’s endorsement. Parliament reviewed and passed amendments to four chapters of the constitution covering elections, presidential terms, political parties, and the electoral commission. Following this, FGS Ministry of Interior drafted three laws to govern and implement an electoral framework consistent with the amended Chapter Four—specifically Articles 52, 53, and 54, which address election-related matters. In November, the federal parliament reviewed, passed, and the president signed them into law:
The National Electoral Bill, The Bill for the Establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission and The Political Associations and Parties Law. These bills form the cornerstone FGS strategy to deliver ‘one person, one vote’ elections at all three levels of government. But contrary to the goal, 18 members were selected based on the 4.5 power-sharing formula the very system which they are tasked to move way the country. The new political association and parties' law limits national political parties to three only and the requirements favors the big four clans, the registration requirement that potential political associations and parties must have offices in four FMSs and the Benadir region makes it likely that major clans will dominate in the three-party system. The electoral bill requires consideration be given clan representation when political parties nominate candidates for Lower House elections. This is a continuation of 4.5 formula over national political leadership.
But here’s where it gets messy: after these legal changes, Jubaland withdrew from the National Consultative Council—a platform where the FGS president, prime minister, five federal member states (FMS) leaders, and the Benadir governor discuss national political issues and make suggestions. At this point, FGS had paused the process to engage Jubaland president. That didn’t bring desire result of FGS leaders, Jubaland held its own elections in December 2024, thumbing its nose at Mogadishu’s grand vision and FGS deployed SNA to force him out but failed. Puntland did the same back in January 2024, re-electing Said Deni through its clan-based parliament after scrapping a universal suffrage plan that sparked riots. Meanwhile, the leaders of Southwest, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug—whose terms have expired—agreed FGS’s proposal.
FGS doubled down on its push for direct, the new electoral commission began election operations. On January 20, 2025, the commission officially commenced its work, prioritizing three tasks: registering political parties, releasing a provisional election schedule, and identifying 300 polling stations nationwide. Provisional Election Schedule: June 2025-Local council elections and September 2025- Federal Member State elections
What is at play?
At the heart of Somalia’s political gridlock is a complex mix of interests—clan loyalties, personal ambition, and competing visions of democracy. It’s not always about what’s best for the country, but rather about who holds the reins and what that brings in return.
Take a closer look, and things become clearer. Many leaders—whether at the federal or regional level—are deeply invested in maintaining control over their respective areas. For some, holding on to even a few districts is enough. Why? Because power, no matter the scale, comes with influence and resources. Clan dynamics also play a big role—support often follows lines of identity rather than track records. It’s not uncommon to hear, “Our guy is president” or “our clan has the prime minister.” For many, that alone feels like a win.
Security forces, too, often align more closely with their clan affiliations or whoever ensures their paycheck, rather than a unified national cause. This makes building a national army or coherent security policy extremely challenging.
Meanwhile, the federal government continues to push for a one-person-one-vote national election. While admirable in theory, this plan faces serious hurdles—logistical, political, and security-related. The reality is that in many areas, especially those affected by Al-Shabaab, holding safe, inclusive elections remains a distant goal. But by pushing this agenda, the FGS maintains the upper hand, and delays in implementation often lead to term extensions for those already in office.
Some federal member state leaders—particularly in Southwest, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug—have supported the FGS proposal, not necessarily because they believe it’s achievable, but because it aligns with their interest in staying in power. On the other hand, leaders in Jubaland and Puntland, concerned about being sidelined, have opted to take a more independent path. Their aim? To protect their positions and ensure they have a say in the eventual outcome.
As the president’s term nears its end, what’s likely is a round of high-stakes negotiations. The result? A return to indirect elections, where key players can shape the process to suit their interests. It’s less about the system and more about who controls it.
In short, Somalia’s political scene is stuck—not because solutions don’t exist, but because the players involved are still navigating a system where holding power is often more important than using it to drive national progress.
What is at stake?
Somalia people are caught in a dire humanitarian crisis, fueled by relentless conflict, climate shocks, and political instability. Nearly 6 million, about 38% of the population, need urgent aid due to severe food insecurity, water shortages, and mass displacement. Around 3.5 million are internally displaced by war and natural disasters like droughts and floods. Acute malnutrition grips 1.6 million children under five, while cholera outbreaks, crumbling health and sanitation systems, and restricted aid access—worsened by Al-Shabaab’s control and clan rivalries—pile on the misery.
Public services? It has been 25 years since a new government was reestablished in Kenya, and there are no tangible of public services and some parts of the country still no trace of them. FGS and FMS collect taxes, but the people see no real return, just a void filled by United Nations agencies and international NGOs stepping in where leaders prioritize their selfish political power plays over citizens’ needs.
Federalization and rebuilding? Deadlocked. Every government since the 2012 constitution promised to complete the federal process, but the actual details—how roles, responsibilities, and resources will be divided between the FGS and FMS—remain a mystery. What we have got now is not a federal or a republic, it is chaos.
Security sector reform is a pipe dream too. Effective Somali security forces—one that can protect people without depending heavily on foreign support, especially forces able to take over from African Union troops are a must for democratic elections, stability, and a legitimate government. Instead, we have got a force that many see as a mix of clans, lacking discipline and unity. In many places, people trust local militias more.
Al-Shabaab keeps proving it can hit civilians, military posts, and government targets at will, exploiting the government’s failures in justice, education, and jobs for the youth. Somali National Army (SNA) has been on the offensive for three years, taking back territory, but it does not have the ability to secure those gains. What is missing? The capacity to bring back basic law and order, establish governance, and provide services after fighting. SNA can push Al-Shabaab out, but it’s not built to navigate local politics or stick around other battles call them away. We need “holding forces” to take over recovered areas, along with legitimate local authorities to rebuild and deliver services.
What should be done?
Stop pushing unrealistic changes without agreement from stakeholders. Ignoring the bigger picture for personal gain will keep this cycle going until the end of time. Until the “me first” crowd steps back, the federal dream remains a mirage, the power play continues, and the people will keep waiting. We have got 30 years of evidence to prove this. The power-sharing formula freezes Somalia in a clan-first mindset, blocking real democracy or national unity. So, the clan-based politics is both a lifeline and a leash—Empty speeches denouncing the clan system won't magically bring about democracy. People rely more on their clans than on the government. When you're sick, in need, need protection, or need a job, you turn to your clan to solve your problems. Clan contributions and clan-appointed government officials reinforce this system. To change this, show people what the government can do for them, and they will lead the push for democratization."
Mindset is harder to change with plans, legal frameworks, or empty speeches—action is what changes will. Action with results will shift the mindset. Focus on what is at stake and gradually build democracy. The goal should be to hold a different kind of election—one that changes the scope and size of voters compared to past elections. Since 2012, every election has been somewhat different from the next in scope and number of voters. FGS should keep doing this and test direct election at local council elections to find the best election model. Developing ambitious and unrealistic election plans that go against stated goals will only continue the classic Somali paradox we have seen for the last 30 years.
Somali political actors, including the clan actors, need to prioritize solving the bigger constitutional question: how will the Somali federal system work, and how will rights, responsibilities, and powers be shared between the center and the regions? This will bring clarity to the relationship between FGS and FMS. It will also open the path for a better working relationship on all the urgent issues involved in rebuilding an effective Somali state, including the security sector.
In the same way, international partners need to work in Somalia in a more united way, even with the pressures of their own domestic priorities. Democratic elections are not the top priority for the people of Somalia. Developing the security sector is part of the larger state-building and peace-building agenda. Because of this, external actors must find the right balance between pushing constructively and giving the process enough space and time. Strategic patience is needed from everyone, along with the flexibility to take advantage of opportunities when they come. These opportunities might include deeper political agreements within FMS that create new space for integrating local forces, or major military offensives that open up new towns and villages, providing chances to bring new groups and communities into the FMS and FGS structures.
Likewise, keep working toward a more comprehensive approach that aims for peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. This means broadening the focus to include political, economic, and governance issues will require bringing together different stakeholders and groups who are not used to working together. It will also highlight that strengthening security in Somalia is not only about fighting Al-Shabaab, but also about tackling the widespread problems of injustice, impunity, and corruption that Al-Shabaab uses to its advantage.